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Investigating Grand Juries: A Comparison of
Pennsylvania's Judicially and Legislatively
Created Bodies
I. INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY
The grand jury has been described by some as the "noblest check
upon the malice and oppression of individuals and states,"' and by
others as an unnecessary, untrained, time-consuming body acting
merely as a rubber stamp upon the prosecutor's indictments.! Un-
doubtedly, the grand jury as an indicting body has declined in
popularity.' However, the grand jury as an investigatory body has
developed into an effective crime detecting mechanism particularly well-
suited to uncovering governmental corruption' and organized
1. See G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 1 (1906) [hereinafter cited as EDWARDS].
2. See Note, The Grand Jury-Its Investigating Powers and Limitations, 37 MINN.
L. REV. 586, 586 n.2 [hereinafter cited as The Grand Jury]. See also Scragg, The Grand
Jury, 2 TEMP. L.Q. 317, 319-21 (1928).
3. Prior to 1973, the Pennsylvania Constitution provided: "No person shall for any
indictable offense, be proceeded against criminally, by information. ... This provision
was amended in 1973 to permit "the initiation of criminal proceedings therein by informa-
tion filed in the manner provided by law." PA. CONST. art. I, § 10. England has effectively
abolished the grand jury. See Trumples, Decadence of the Grand Jury System in Eng-
land, 23 THE PANEL 7 (1945). A majority of states have long used the information system.
See Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L. REV. 101 (1931).
4. See Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE
L.J. 687, 694-700 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Dession & Cohen]; Note, Discretionary
Power in the Judiciary to Organize a Special Investigating Grand Jury, 111 U. PA. L.
REV. 954, 957 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Discretionary Power in the Judiciary]. But see
Konowitz, The Grand Jury as an Investigating Body of Public Officials, 10 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 219, 231-32 (1936).
Allegations of government corruption within Pennsylvania have led to grand jury in-
vestigations into such matters as the conduct of employees of the Department of Trans-
portation, see Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 396 A.2d 1311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); alleged
agreements among state police troopers to omit information from accident reports regard-
ing the intoxication of troopers involved in automobile accidents, see Commonwealth v.
Barger, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 59, 375 A.2d 756 (1977); the unlawful appropriation of city labor
and materials for private use by city officials, see Manko Appeal, 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 177,
77 A.2d 700 (1951); and the sale to the highest bidder of appointments to office by govern-
ment officials, see Commonwealth v. Dietrich, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 515 (1898). Probably the
most celebrated case concerning the investigation of alleged government corruption oc-
curred in 1938 when the legislature, called into emergency session by the governor,
enacted legislation specifically designed to prevent the investigation of the government by
a grand jury. See Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1), 332 Pa.
289, 2 A.2d 783 (1938).
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crime.' Although other nonjudicial bodies' have entered the investigating
arena, it is questionable whether they can operate in a manner superior
to that of the grand jury.7 The purpose of this comment is to explore the
development of this judicially created body in Pennsylvania and to com-
pare it to the investigatory body recently created by the state
legislature.'
The existence of various types of grand juries geared to uncovering
crimes has created confusion regarding the proper title to be assigned
a given investigatory body? Thus, it is not uncommon for a court to
use the generic term "grand jury" without further specifying the par-
ticular body under discussion. As a result, it is often unclear whether a
It should be noted that although a grand jury investigation can be directed at alleged
illegalities in a state agency or local government, it cannot be directed to review the
quality of administration in government agencies. See Dauphin County Grand Jury In-
vestigation Proceedings (No. 1), 332 Pa. at 295, 2 A.2d at 787; Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa.
433 (1878); Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 396 A.2d 1311, 1315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Grand
Jury Investigation of Western State Penitentiary, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 197, 203-04, 96 A.2d
189, 192 (1953).
5. See Kid, Why The Grand Jury's Power Is a Menace to Organized Crime, 12 THE
PANEL 103 (1934).
6. Examples of nonjudicial investigative bodies include legislative committees,
special administrative boards, the governor or Attorney General, the press, and private
individuals and organizations. For a discussion comparing the investigatory abilities of
grand juries to various types of nonjudicial bodies, see Dession & Cohen, supra note 4, at
694-712.
7. See Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Kuhl, where it is stated:
Investigatory committees, whether of the legislative or of the executive arm of
government, suffer common defects. Their members, being either elected or
appointed by elected officials, ordinarily are not completely free of political motiva-
tion. Elected officials and professional investigators are apt to find their own per-
sonal interests best fostered by publicity. Consequently, investigations are most
often either conducted in full public spotlight, or are punctuated by frequent
reports to the public of interim results .... As the outcome of all these investiga-
tions is probably influenced by political considerations, partiality and a deliberate
lack of thoroughness are apt to be present.
Id. at 1118. See generally T. TAYLOR. GRAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL IN-
VESTIGATIONS (1955). Additionally, investigations by legislative committees are repeatedly
attacked on the ground that the committee lacks jurisdiction to investigate the matter.
See Dession & Cohen, supra note 4, at 699-700; Discretionary Power in the Judiciary,
supra note 4, at 956.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 265-278 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
9. As stated by Justice Musmanno:
The confusion between a Special Grand Jury and a Regular Grand Jury con-
ducting a special investigation has produced a terminological melange to which, un-
fortunately, even judges have contributed. Lamentably, even in the State Reports,
the phrase "Special Grand Jury" is occasionally used when the writer really has in
mind a Regular Grand Jury conducting a special investigation.
Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 568, 185 A.2d 135, 143 (1962).
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particular decision is applicable to all types of grand juries or is
limited to the particular body involved in the decision." It is, therefore,
necessary at the outset to suggest a definitional framework within
which to operate.
At common law, a grand jury which was organized and returned in-
dictments to the court in accordance with the terms of a statute was
properly designated a "regular grand jury."'" The phrase "special
grand jury" referred to one organized under an exercise of judicial dis-
cretion as opposed to a statutory scheme. 2 An "investigating grand
jury" was one, whether regularly or specially organized, engaged in
conducting investigations in addition to simply returning indictments. 3
In Pennsylvania the courts have recognized two types of grand
juries: namely, a special grand jury which is selected solely for perform-
ing investigatory duties; 4 and an investigating grand jury, which is
impaneled to return indictments (regular grand jury) and is also charged
to conduct investigations. 5 Unlike the common law definition, the term
"special" in Pennsylvania does not indicate the manner in which the
grand jury is impaneled, but rather the purpose for which it is convened.
Throughout this comment, unless otherwise indicated, the phrases
"grand jury investigaton" and "grand jury conducting an investiga-
tion" will be used to designate both special and investigating grand
juries.
Generally, after the grand jury has commenced its investigation, a
series of reports or presentments may be issued. 6 While a report is a
written comment directed either at unwholesome, noncriminal activity
10. This statement is premised upon the notion that there is reason to suggest that
different rules are applicable to the various types of grand jury investigations. One area
where different rules have been held applicable depending upon the type of grand jury in-
vestigation involved concerns the effect of irregularities committed during the investiga-
tory stage on the indicting stage of the proceedings. See notes 124-129 and accompanying
text infra.
11. See Discretionary Power in the Judiciary, supra note 4, at 957. See also 4 F.
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1697, at 440-42 (Anderson ed. 1957).
12. See Discretionary Power in the Judiciary, supra note 4, at 957.
13. Id.
14. Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 568, 185 A.2d 135, 143 (1962). See also In Re:
January 1974 Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa. 586, 595 n.4, 328
A.2d 485, 489 n.4 (1974).
15. Id See also Ranney, Grand Juries in Pennsylvania, 37 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 4
(1975).
16. A single grand jury conducting an investigation may issue as many presentments
or reports as is necessary. For example, the grand jury convened in June, 1972, and
charged by Judge Takiff, issued twenty-one presentments. See In Re: January 1974 Phila-
delphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa. 586, 328 A.2d 485 (1974).
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or at criminal activity for which prosecution is barred, 7 a presentment
is a written charge of a crime issued by the grand jury conducting an
investigation.18 Practically speaking, a presentment is an instruction to
the district attorney to submit a bill of indictment to the indicting
grand jury.1' It is these two devices which provide the grand jury con-
ducting an investigation with the means of publicizing the results of its
investigation and bringing to trial those individuals suspected of
wrongdoing. In light of the potentially oppressive nature of these dual
powers, it is especially important to recognize the limits within which
grand jury investigations must be conducted.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE GRAND JURY
The origins of the grand jury system, in which an individual is ac-
cused of wrongdoing by an independent body of jurors, has been the
subject of considerable debate void of any definitive answers."
Although the term "grand jury" (le graunde inquest) was initially ap-
plied during the reign of Edward the Third, 1 that body was merely a
refinement of an already existing body of accusers known as the "hun-
dred inquest."2' It is believed that as early as the rule of Ethelred the
17. See Discretionary Power in the Judiciary, supra note 4, at 958 n.30. See also
Dession & Cohen, supra note 4, at 705-06; Kuh, supra note 7, at 1103; Note, The Grand
Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L. REV. 590, 593-96 (1961). For a listing of cases
considering the issue whether a grand juror may be held liable for statements contained
in a report see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 716 (1956).
18. See Dession & Cohen, supra note 4, at 705-06. See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *301.
19. See Dession & Cohen, supra note 4, at 705-06. See also Bell, The Several Modes
of Instituting Criminal Proceedings in Pennsylvania, 13 Pa. Dist. Rep. 815, 826-29 (1904).
It is not unusual for a bill of indictment to be endorsed with an order stating that the
"within Indictment [is] based upon Presentment .. " Commonwealth v. Gross,. 172 Pa.
Sup. Ct. 85, 88, 92 A.2d 251 (1952). See also Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 108
A.2d 780 (1954). However, the presentment cannot allege crimes unrelated to the scope of
the investigation. Commonwealth v. Soloff, 175 Pa. Super. Ct. 423, 427, 107 A.2d 179, 180
(1954). Nor can it relate to conditions rather than violations of the criminal law. See Grand
Jury Investigation of Western State Penitentiary, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 197, 202, 96 A.2d
189, 192 (1953).
20. Historians remain divided over whether the grand jury had its origin in Norman
or Anglo-Saxon cultures. Compare EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 2 and 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *301 (Anglo-Saxon) with 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312
(7th rev. ed. 1899) and T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 99 (1929)
(Norman). See also Segal, Spivack & Costilo, Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation in
Pennsylvania, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 73, 74 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Obtaining a Grand Jury In-
vestigation].
21. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 2.
22. Id. at 25-26. The term le graunde inquest was used not to distinguish the grand
from the petit or trial jury, but rather to distinguish the grand jury from the hundred in-
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Second (A.D. 978-1016) the English system of frank pledge23 was sup-
plemented by a body of twelve thanes of each hundred (wapentake)
charged with the duty of identifying criminals."' This system of indict-
ment received statutory recognition in the Assize of Clarendon issued
in 1166."5 The development of le graunde inquest caused the decline in
influence of the hundred inquests until it no longer presented of-
fenders. At this point in history, the grand jury was an arm of the
government functioning as a public prosecutor charged with ferreting
out crime.'
The conception of the grand jury as the guardian of the rights and
liberties of the people' stems from the actions of two grand juries im-
paneled in 1681 where the jurors were confronted with indictments
against Stephen College and the Earl of Shaftesbury for high treason.
After hearing the testimony of witnesses in private, the jurors ignored
the bills without explanation. Thus, the combination of the secrecy' of
its proceedings and the ability to act on indictments without explana-
tion provided the grand jury with the ability to protect individual
freedoms.' As one writer concludes: "The grand jury emerged as a
body which performed antithetical functions-a virtual janus who, at
one moment acted as the vigilant prosecutor and at the next moment,
acted as the defender of those who were unjustly accused." 2
The failure of many courts to recognize the dual roles played by the
grand jury explains the often contradictory results reached between
quest. Id. at 26. See also 2 M. HALE'S, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 164c (lst
Am. ed. 1847) [hereinafter cited as PLEAS OF THE CROWN].
23. Under the frank pledge system, each male member of a tithing was a surety to
the king and was responsible for the good conduct of the others. Thus, each member had
a duty to divulge to the king the criminal conduct of others. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 3.
24. Id. at 4-5.
25. Id. at 7. But see Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury,
10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701, 703-07 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz], where it is sug-
gested that the true statutory ancestor of the modern grand jury was the Constitution of
Clarendon signed by Thomas Becket in 1164 amid pressure from Henry the Second. That
document gave the king's courts jurisdiction over clergymen accused of committing
crimes. For a discussion of the procedural aspects of impaneling a hundred inquest see E-
WARDS, supra note 1, at 19-20; PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 22, at 164a-b.
26. See EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 27; Schwartz, supra note 25, at 710.
27. McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 57, 187 A. 498, 503 (1936).
28. For a discussion of the secrecy surrounding grand jury actions, see 1 F. WHAR-
TON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 221 (12th ed. 1974).
29. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 28-30. For a thorough discussion of these two cases,
see Schwartz, supra note 25, at 710-21.
30. Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 20, at 76. This was not to be
the end of attacks directed at the power of grand juries. In 1783, a Pennsylvania grand
jury received severe reproof from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for refusing to return
a true bill of indictment against the printer of the Independent Gazette for articles he
published criticizing the conduct of that court. See EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 31.
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majority and dissenting opinions regarding the extent of power held
by the grand jury." A grand jury charged solely with handling indict-
ments performs a protective function because it can refuse to return
an indictment, thereby preventing prosecution of the accused. On the
other hand, a grand jury conducting an investigation is cast in the role
of a public prosecutor"2 and, of necessity, must be afforded broad in-
vestigatory powers. The development of these powers is a subject on
which historians are silent. 3 In McNair's Petition,' the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Kephart, traced the initial
acknowledgment of the inquisitorial powers of the grand jury in Penn-
sylvania back to 1792."5 But regardless of its origin, the grand jury is
presently well-equipped to act as an investigatory body.
III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS
IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. Requirements for Convening a Grand Jury Investigation
Unlike other states, 6 Pennsylvania severely restricts the use of
grand jury investigations. 7 In this respect, the Pennsylvania courts
have consistently enumerated five minimum requisites for obtaining a
grand jury investigation:' specifically, that the subject matter of the
investigation must affect the community as a whole rather than as in-
31. See, e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions in Philadelphia County Grand Jury
Investigation Case, 347 Pa. 316, 32 A.2d 199 (1943); Dauphin County Grand Jury Investi-
gation Proceedings (No. 1), 332 Pa. 289, 2 A.2d 783 (1938). See also Obtaining a Grand
Jury Investigation supra note 20, at 76-77.
32. See Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 20, at 76-77.
33. Id, See also McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 56-57 n.1, 187 A. 498, 502-03 n.1 (1936).
34. 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498 (1936).
35. Id. at 57, 187 A. at 503. But see Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation, supra note
20, at 75 n.22.
36. See F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1263 (10th ed. 1958). One of the most
liberal forms of investigatory grand juries was authorized by statute in Michigan. See
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.941-.966 (Callaghan 1978 & Supp. 1980. The statute allowed local
judges to appoint themselves as one-man grand juries and to employ a staff for assistance
with the investigation. See generally Marsh, Michigan's "One Man Grand Jury," 8 J. AM.
JUD. Soc'Y 121 (1924); Winters, The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 28 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y
137 (1945).
37. McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 58, 187 A. 498, 503 (1936). See also Dession &
Cohen, supra note 4. at 695.
38. Commonwealth ex rel Camelot Detective Agency, Inc. v. Specter, 451 Pa. 370,
374, 303 A.2d 203, 205 (1973); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 137 n.26, 277
A.2d 764, 774 n.26, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1000 (1971); McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 60-62,
187 A. 498, 504 (1936); Matter of the Communication of the Grand Jury (Lloyd and
Carpenter's Case), 5 PA. L.J. 55, 3 Clark 188 (Quarter Sessions Phila. 1845). See also Ob-
taining a Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 20, at 79-97.
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dividuals;' that the investigation must be aimed at conditions as opposed
to individuals;'0 that the ordinary processes of law enforcement must
be inadequate to deal with the alleged crimes; 1 that the investigation
must have a defined scope, 2 directed at crimes, 3 and supported by in-
formation indicating the existence of systematic crime or widespread
conspiracy;" and finally, that the information must come from direct
39. Examples of such subject matter include riots, general public nuisances affecting
the public health, flagrant vices tending to debauch the public morals, "and the like." Mat-
ter of the Communication of the Grand Jury (Lloyd and Carpenter's Case), 5 PA. L.J. 55,
58, 3 Clark 188, 192 (Quarter Sessions, Phila. 1845). See also Obtaining a Grand Jury In-
vestigatio, supra note 20, at 80-82. Government corruption has proven a popular subject
for grand jury investigations in Pennsylvania. See cases cited at note 4, supra.
40. The purpose of this requirement is to avoid the investigation of individuals on
allegations of ordinary crimes which the regular police force is equipped to handle. See
Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 20, at 84-87. This is not to suggest that
a petition cannot name specific individuals as allegedly having committed certain crimes.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 108 A.2d 780 (1954); Commonwealth v.
Gross, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 92 A.2d 251 (1952). For an example of an investigation where
this requirement was apparently ignored, see Commonwealth v. Hackney, 117 Pa.-Super.
Ct. 519, 178 A. 417 (1935) (allocatur refused).
41. As was recognized by one group of commentators:
The principal reason for this requirement is that when the ordinary processes of
law are sufficient, defendants will also be assured the usual protections of the law,
including the right to a preliminary hearing. Resort to extraordinary proceedings
are viewed as infringements on the rights of citizens which are to be avoided.
Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 20, at 87 (footnotes omitted). See also
Commonwealth v. Field, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 53, 331 A.2d 744 (1974) (since use of investi-
gative grand jury dispenses with preliminary arraignment and preliminary hearing, the
power to convene such a grand jury is a delicate one).
The ordinary processes of law enforcement have been found inadequate for various
reasons. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barger, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 59, 68, 375 A.2d 756, 761
(1977) (subpoena power needed to acquire answers to questions which are essential for a
full investigation and the parties are uncooperative in relinquishing the information
sought); Commonwealth v. Rhey, 140 Pa. Super. Ct. 340, 344, 14 A.2d 192, 195 (1940)
(allocatur refused) (public would suffer from delays incident to ordinary procedure).
42. See Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation supra note 20, at 90-92. The scope of
the investigation must be limited by the charge from the court. See Smith v. Gallagher,
408 Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135 (1962). A grand jury conducting an investigation has no author-
ity to issue a presentment alleging crimes not within the scope of the charge. Common-
wealth v. Soloff, 175 Pa. Super. Ct. 423, 107 A.2d 179 (1954) (presentment accusing police
officers of having beaten a prisoner was not within charge to grand jury to investigate
whether city police had protected criminals for financial gain). However, this requirement
of a limiting charge has not gone without criticism. See The Grand Jury, supra note 2, at
594 (objective of having available a body of interested citizens to independently check on
the affairs of the community can only be satisfied if the grand jury is free to investigate
matters of its own choosing).
43. McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 58, 187 A. 498, 503 (1936) ("Thb grand jury is an
arm of the criminal court, and criminal acts alone must be the foundation of its delibera-
tions"). See also Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 20, at 90-92.
44. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a petition must allege the com-
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knowledge or a trustworthy source. 5 In light of these requirements, it
is apparent that the Pennsylvania judiciary is reluctant to allow uncon-
trolled grand jury investigations. The courts have repeatedly expressed
the fear that a grand jury conducting an investigation might, "if
unrestrained and unguarded, encroach upon the very liberties which it
was created to protect."6
A grand jury investigation may be initiated in response to either a
petition" or a memorial. 8 The difference between a petition and a
memorial is that the latter is filed by a private citizen, and the former
is filed by the district attorney or Attorney General."' Although the
Pennsylvania courts have traditionally attached no significance to this
distinction,' it was held in Hamilton Appeal5' that a memorialist has no
right to appeal the denial of a requested investigation. Here the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court reasoned that because a memorial is not a
pleading creating a litigable controversy, the individual presenting it
has no standing to appeal its denial.5 2 Such reasoning seems to be
equally applicable to petitions. In addition to being refused the right to
mission of at least one crime. Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No.
1). 332 Pa. 289, 2 A.2d 783 (1938).
45. This requirement is satisfied where it is alleged that as a result of a preliminary
investigation, knowledge of facts and circumstances which establish the existence of cor-
ruption has been established. See Commonwealth v. Barger, 249 Pa. Super. Ct. 59, 68, 375
A.2d 756, 761 (1977). However, a general statement that one "has been informed and
believes" that crimes have been committed is insufficient. See Philadelphia County Grand
Jury Investigation Case, 347 Pa. 316, 321, 32 A.2d 199, 202 (1943). See also Obtaining a
Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 20, at 92-97.
46. McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 58, 187 A. 498, 502 (1936).
47. For a discussion of petitions, see Commonwealth ex rel Camelot Detective
Agency, Inc. v. Specter, 451 Pa. 370, 303 A.2d 203 (1973); Special Grand Jury Case, 397
Pa. 254, 154 A.2d 592 (1959); Commonwealth v. Bestwick, 396 A.2d 1311 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1978); Grand Jury Investigation of Western State Penitentiary, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 197, 96
A.2d 189 (1953).
48. For a discussion of memorials, see Hamilton Appeal, 407 Pa. 366, 369, 180 A.2d
782, 784 (1962) (Cohen, J., concurring); Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation
Case, 347 Pa. 316, 32 A.2d 199 (1943).
49. See In Re: January 1974 Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa.
586, 596, 328 A.2d 485, 490 (1974); Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 20, at
78.
50. Obtaining a Grand Jury Investigation, supra note 20, at 78 n.36.
51. 407 Pa. 336, 180 A.2d 782 (1962).
52. This reasoning was succinctly summarized by Justice Cohen as follows:
A memorial is not a pleading. Its presentation neither institutes a legal pro-
ceeding, nor does it bring any "parties" before the court. Merely because the court
determines specially to charge a grand jury to undertake an investigation gives no
right to the memorialists to control the investigation or even participate in it.
It follows that individuals filing a memorial with a court have no standing as
litigants .... It is clear beyond doubt that the court's determination specially to
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appeal the denial of a requested investigation, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recently held in In re Biester' that a private citizen,
relying solely on his status as a taxpayer, lacks standing to challenge
the validity of a grand jury investigation."
A petition, and presumably a memorial, can be amended.55 But the
issue of whether a petition can be supplemented by additional sources
after it has been filed has not been conclusively resolved. In Grand
Jury Investigation of Western State Penitentiary," the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania, without citing authority, stated that a petition "must
be self-sustaining. 51 This precise issue again confronted the superior
court in Commonwealth v. Bestwick,' where an equally divided court
affirmed the conviction of a state employee for violation of the Anti
Macing Act. As a ground for appeal, the appellant had asserted that
since the petition requesting the grand jury investigation was sup-
plemented with information received during an in camera hearing, the
entire investigation was invalid. 9 In response to this assertion, three
members of the court argued that neither authority nor reason exists
for preventing a court from supplementing a petition."0 Arguing the
contrary position, Judge Hester, joined by Judges Cercone and Van
der Voort, maintained that the justification for convening an in-
vestigative grand jury must be found within the petition alone." Addi-
tionally, Judge Hester expressed the fear that without a self-sustaining
petition, "the grand jury will lack 'a sound, solid basis on which to pro-
charge or not to charge the grand jury is not subject to appeal since there is no
litigable controversy.
Id. at 370-71, 180 A.2d at 785 (Cohen, J., concurring).
53. 409 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1979).
54. Id. at 851-52. Prior to this decision, the court had held in Smith v. Gallagher, 408
Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135 (1962), that a citizen's taxpayer status was sufficient to confer stand-
ing to challenge the validity of a grand jury investigation. The Beister court expressly
overruled the Smith decision on this point.
55. See Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1), 332 Pa. 289,
326, 2 A.2d 783, 800 (1938).
56. 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 197, 96 A.2d 189 (1953).
57. Id. at 203, 96 A.2d at 191.
58. 396 A.2d 1311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
59. Id. at 1313.
60. Judges Price and Jacobs argued that no authority exists which prohibits use of
an in camera hearing to supplement a petition. Id at 1315 (Price, J., supporting affirm-
ance). Judge Spaeth argued that a court "should not hold a petition inadequate where, as
here, its holes were filled in by information presented to the convening judge." Id. at 1319
(Spaeth, J., supporting affirmance). Judge Price later reiterated his argument in Common-
wealth v. lacino, 401 A.2d 1355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). Although Price's opinion in Iacino
represented the majority viewpoint, the case was not heard by the court en banc, but
rather was heard by a four judge panel.
61. 396 A.2d at 1323 (Hester, J., supporting reversal).
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ceed' . . . and run the risk of becoming an uncontrolled instrument."62
There seems to be little, if any, reason for denying supplementary
proceedings to cure a defective petition, especially since a defective
petition can be amended. 3 The concern of Judge Hester in Bestwick
that the investigation may become uncontrolled ignores the fact that
the scope of a grand jury investigation is actually limited by the
charge of the court." Moreover, the purpose of any supplementary pro-
ceedings is to assist the court in preparing a proper charge.
Regardless of the contents of the petition, then, it is the duty of the
court to limit the investigation and this duty can be effectively per-
formed by allowing a petition to be supplemented.
Finally, although a court can sua sponte charge a regular grand jury
to conduct a special investigation, 5 it appears that no such authority
exists for convening a special grand jury;66 nor, in any event, can a
grand jury commence an investigation on its own motion.67 Regardless
of the type of investigation sought, or the manner in which it is in-
stigated, the requirements for convening a grand jury investigation
must be met.66 Once properly convened, the grand jury is not
restricted as to its duration, 9 although it cannot become a permanent
body." However, this sole prohibition can be easily averted by conven-
62. Id.
63. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
64. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
65. See In Re: January 1974 Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa.
586, 328 A.2d 485 (1974); In Re Grand Jury Investigation of Registration Comm'n, 22 Pa.
D. & C. 2d 285 (1960).
66. See In Re: January 1974 Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa.
586, 328 A.2d 485 (1974). The court in that case divorced "the question of the power of the
court to direct a grand jury investigation on its own motion from the question of the
court's power to convene a special grand jury." Id at 595, 328 A.2d at 489. However, in
Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 188 A.2d 135 (1962), the court argued that the "power to
convene a special grand jury is not an inherent judicial power." Id at 587, 185 A.2d at
153.
67. See In Re: January 1974 Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa.
586, 596, 328 A.2d 485, 490 (1974); McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 58, 187 A. 498, 503 (1936).
68. See In Re: January 1974 Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa.
586, 328 A.2d 485 (1974) (requirements applicable to grand jury charged to conduct a
special investigation); Commonwealth ex reL Camelot Detective Agency, Inc. v. Specter,
451 Pa. 370, 303 A.2d 203 (1973) (requirements applicable where district attorney petitions
for a special grand jury).
69. See Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 2 A.2d 298 (1938). Subsequent to Shenker, Rule
204 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure was adopted. PA. R. CRIM. P. 204.
This rule permits a grand jury to be retained to complete business presented to it during
the period for which it was originally summoned. The impact of the rule was discussed by
the court in In Re: January 1974 Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa.
at 599, 328 A.2d at 491.
70. See Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 2 A.2d 298 (1938). See also In Re: January 1974
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ing successive grand juries to investigate the same subject.71
B. Investigative Tools of the Grand Jury Conducting an Investigation
The tools available to the grand jury include the personal knowledge
of the jurors," subpoenas,73 including subpoenas duces tecum,7' the
assistance and guidance of the district attorney,75 and the use of a
stenographer." The grand jury may also seek immunity for a witness77
summoned to appear, and may request the court to issue contempt
citations for recalcitrant witnesses." However, a grand jury cannot
hire private counsel, special investigators, or private accountants.7 9
Finally, it is interesting to note that neither the exclusionary rule"° nor
Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa. at 599, 328 A.2d at 491 (nine
months not reaching admonition stated in Shenker).
71. See In Re: January 1974 Philadelphia County Grand Jury Investigation, 458 Pa.
at 599, 328 A.2d at 491. The court reasoned that each time a new grand jury is convened
"there is a judicial reevaluation of the prerequisites for maintaining a grand jury investi-
gation." Id.
72. This stems from the early conception of the grand jury as a body whose function
it was to report on the crimes known to its members to have been committed by others
within their wapentake. See note 24 and accompanying text supra. See also The Grand
Jury, supra note 2, at 595.
73. McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 58, 187 A. 498, 503 (1936). The court must first ap-
prove the request for a subpoena. Id. However, this appears to be a hollow requirement.
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973) (federal grand jury sub-
poenas are issued pro forma and in blank); Carabello Appeal, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 479, 357
A.2d 628 (1976) (judge has no duty to investigate the propriety of each subpoena prior to
its issuance).
74. Salvitti Appeal, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 465, 357 A.2d 622 (1976) (government is re-
quired to make some preliminary showing that each item requested is relevant to the in-
vestigation). See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 203 F. Supp. 575
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); In re Hawkins, 50 Del. 61, 123 A.2d 113 (1956).
75. See Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Super. Ct. 107, 113, 14 A.2d 907, 910
(1940) (allocatur refused) ("It is the duty of the district attorney, either personally or
through his assistants, to attend upon a grand jury, lay before them all matters upon
which they are to pass, aid them in the examination of witnesses and give general instruc-
tions as may be required").
76. See id. (where an investigation by a grand jury was of public concern, it was
within power of court to appoint special assistants to the district attorney and to
authorize the latter to engage additional stenographers).
77. Riccobene Appeal, 439 Pa. 404, 268 A.2d 104 (1970) (whether or not to grant im-
munity is primarily a matter between prosecutor and court, and not for witness' concern).
Immunity of witnesses is presently governed by 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5947 (Purdon
Supp. 1979).
78. See, e.g., Manko Appeal, 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 77 A.2d 700 (1951) (contempt
citation for refusal to answer after fifth amendment claim is rejected reversed because ap-
pellant stood in position of an accused before the grand jury).
79. For a discussion of a grand jury investigation that clearly exceeded permissible
limits, see Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 185 A.2d 135 (1962).
80. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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the normal rules of evidence"' are applicable in grand jury investiga-
tions.
C. Rights of Subpoenaed Parties
The use of subpoena powers by the grand jury conducting an in-
vestigation has naturally prompted litigation delineating the rights and
privileges of the party being summoned.8" In analyzing this subject, it
is essential to isolate the rights or privileges involved and the relation-
ship of-the party being summoned to the purpose of the investigation.
The rights and privileges generally sought to be protected include the
right to refuse to appear 3 and to testify, 4 the right to counsel, 5 and
the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.8
Esentially, there are three types of witness relationships in which
these rights and privileges arise: a regular witness, a virtual or
putative defendant,87 and an individual named in a petition8" but unin-
dicted when subpoenaed.89 The courts have not, however, extended any
additional rights or privileges to a virtual defendant greater than those
already extended a regular witness; thus, the rights and privileges af-
forded a regular witness and a virtual defendant are the same.0 On the
other hand, the rights and privileges of an individual named in a peti-
81. According to the majority opinion in Commonwealth v. Gross, 172 Pa. Super. Ct.
85, 92 A.2d 251 (1952) "[p]roof that a grand jury heard irrelevant testimony ... or hearsay
evidence . . . or incompetent witnesses . . . will not invalidate an indictment where other
proper evidence was adduced before it." Id. at 92, 92 A.2d at 254.
82. The delineation of the rights and privileges to be accorded a grand jury witness
has generally been determined in litigation attempting to quash indictments and suppress
evidence, e.g., Commonwealth v. Columbia Investment Corp., 457 Pa. 353, 325 A.2d 289
(1974); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1000
(1971); or to reverse contempt citations, e.g., Commonwealth v. Haines, 171 Pa. Super. Ct.
362, 90 A.2d 842 (1952); Commonwealth v. Butler, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 350, 90 A.2d 838
(1952); or to reverse perjury convictions, e.g., Commonwealth v. Good, 461 Pa. 546, 337
A.2d 288 (1975); Manko Appeal, 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 77 A.2d 700 (1951).
83. See notes 92-111 and accompanying text infra. See also United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1973) (no constitutional prohibition against summoning a potential
defendant); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919) (attendance before grand jury
is public duty every person is bound to perform upon being summoned).
84. See notes 92-111 and accompanying text infra.
85. See notes 117-119 and accompanying text infra.
86. See notes 112-115 and accompanying text infra.
87. A virtual or putative defendant is one whom the grand jury has targeted for in-
dictment but who has not been indicted at the time he is summoned to appear and testify.
See notes 92-111 and accompanying text infra.
88. See notes 40 & 47 supra.
89. See notes 120-129 and accompanying text infra.
90. See notes 92-111 and accompanying text infra.
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tion differ and have been fashioned to reflect the fact that the named
witness stands in the same position as an accused. 1
The United States Supreme Court examined the status of a virtual
defendant in a trilogy of cases beginning with United States v. Mandu-
jano9 2 There, the Court held that where a virtual defendant is apprised
of his fifth amendment privilege and thereafter commits perjury
before a grand jury, the perjured statements may be used against him
in a trial for perjury. 3 Below, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit had suppressed the perjured testimony because the respondent
was not given the Miranda warnings which were thought to be re-
quired in light of his virtual defendant status. 4 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for himself and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist, stressed
that to extend the concept of Miranda to a grand jury witness would
necessitate warning the witness that he has an absolute right to
silence. But, in the view of the Chief Justice, such a warning is not ap-
propriate because a grand jury witness has an absolute duty to answer
all questions, subject only to a valid fifth amendment claim.
In a concurring opinion, Justide Brennan expressed the fear that
prosecutors will employ the tactic of calling a putative defendant
before a grand jury conducting an investigation to question him regard-
ing the events for which he is about to be indicted.96 Accordingly,
Justice Brennan concluded that in the absence of a proper waiver of
the individual's known right to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination, the virtual defendant should not be compelled to testify
before the grand jury conducting an investigation.97
In the second case of the trilogy, United States v. Wong," the
Supreme Court held that perjured testimony given by a virtual defen-
91. See notes 120-129 and accompanying text infra.
92. 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (plurality decision).
93. Id. at 584. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
94. Id. at 569-70.
95. Id. at 580-81. The Chief Justice wrote:
To extend the concept of Miranda . . . would require that the witness be told that
there was an absolute right to silence, and obviously any such warning would be in-
correct, for there is no such right before a grand jury. Under Miranda, a person in
police custody has, of course, an absolute right to decline to answer any question,
incriminating or innocuous .... whereas a grand jury witness, on the contrary, has
an absolute duty to answer all questions, subject only to a valid Fifth Amendment
claim.
Id.
96. Id. at 584-85 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
97. Id. at 598-99 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). A waiver could not be
established unless the putative defendant was warned that "he is currently subject to
possible criminal prosecution for the commission of a stated crime." Id. at 600 (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment).
98. 431 U.S. 174 (1977).
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dant before a grand jury need not be suppressed in the witness' per-
jury trial, despite the absence of any effective fifth amendment warn-
ing having been given to the witness.9 The respondent argued that,
without effective warnings, she was compelled to answer all questions
and that her choice was confined either to self-incrimination or the
commission of perjury.' 0 The Court, in rejecting this argument, flatly
stated that the fifth amendment cannot be employed to protect per-
jury.0 1
In the final case of the trilogy, United States v. Washington,1'2 the
Court confronted the issue of whether testimony given by a virtual
defendant before a grand jury may later be used against him in a pro-
secution for a substantive criminal offense despite the fact that the
witness was not informed of his potential defendant status at the time
he testified. Writing for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Burger
noted that by the time the respondent testified he was well aware of
his potential defendant status."'3 The Chief Justice suggested that no
constitutional infirmity results from the failure to provide a potential
defendant with warnings since status as a potential defendant neither
enlarges nor diminishes one's protection against compelled self-
incrimination. Therefore, according to the majority, such warnings
would have no impact on the protection of fifth amendment rights. ' ,
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the privilege
against self-incrimination "is emptied of substance unless the witness
is further advised by the prosecutor that he is a potential
defendant."'05 Justice Brennan would have held that unless a potential
defendant is warned of his status, his self-incriminating testimony
must be suppressed. 0
99. Id. at 177-79.
100. Id. at 177.
101. Id at 179.
102. 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
103. Id. at 189.
104. Id. at 189. The Chief Justice wrote:
However, all of this is largely irrelevant, since we do not understand what con-
stitutional disadvantage a failure to give potential defendant warnings could pos-
sibly inflict on a grand jury witness. . . .It is firmly settled that the prospect of
being indicted does not entitle a witness to commit perjury, and witnesses who are
not grand jury targets are protected from compulsory self-incrimination to the
same extent as those who are. Because target witness status neither enlarges nor
diminishes the constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination, poten-
tial defendant warnings add nothing of value to protection of Fifth Amendment
rights.
Id.
105. Id. at 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 194 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The refusal of the United States Supreme Court, in this trilogy of
cases, to recognize any distinction between a regular witness and a vir-
tual defendant can be criticized on at least two grounds. First, as a
result of the failure to recognize any distinction between the two types
of witnesses, there exists an overextension of the investigatory powers
of the grand jury, for interrogation of a virtual defendant is permitted
without first informing him of the pending charges."7 A second criti-
cism of the trilogy is that it violates the fundamental principle that the
state must establish its case by evidence independently secured and
not by evidence obtained through the interrogation of an accused
party.10
8
Despite these criticisms, the Supreme Court, led by the conservative
members of the Court, remains firm in its view that a virtual defend-
ant stands before the grand jury in essentially the same position as a
regular witness. Consequently, a virtual defendant is required to ap-
pear and testify, subject only to a valid fifth amendment claim, 9 and is
not entitled to the Miranda warnings or to a warning regarding his vir-
tual defendant status.
In delineating the rights and privileges afforded a virtual defendant,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court shares the restrictive view of the
United States Supreme Court as to a witness' appearing and testify-
ing. In fact, in Commonwealth v. Columbia Investment Corp.," the
court flatly stated that "a grand jury witness, virtual defendant or
otherwise, does not have the right to refuse to appear before a grand
jury and, once there, does not have an unqualified right to remain
silent."' Yet, the Pennsylvania judiciary, unlike the United States
Supreme Court, appears to be cognizant of the potentially unfair situa-
tion confronting a virtual defendant and has provided two additional
safeguards. First, the court has held that regular witnesses and virtual
defendants summoned to appear before a grand jury must be informed
of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination
107. See Note, Self Incrimination by Federal Grand Jury Witnesses: Uniform Protec-
tion Advocated, 67 YALE L.J. 1271, 1276-77 (1958).
108. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment).
109. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (fifth amendment privilege ap-
plicable to grand jury proceedings); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d
764, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1000 (1971) (witness entitled to be informed of his privilege
against self-incrimination). See also notes 112-115 and accompanying text infra.
110. 457 Pa. 353, 325 A.2d 289 (1974).
111. Id. at 366, 325 A.2d at 295. However, this statement is merely dictum since the
court concluded that at the time of testifying the defendants "were in the same position




prior to testifying."' Should the witness or virtual defendant refuse to
answer after his fifth amendment claim is rejected, he is subject to
contempt proceedings." 3 The courts of Pennsylvania also adhere to the
view that the privilege cannot be advanced as a defense to an indict-
ment for perjury" 4 and that the failure to assert the privilege consti-
tutes a waiver."5 In practical terms, this problem of waiver can be cir-
cumvented simply by granting the witness immunity."6 As the second
protective measure, Pennsylvania permits the witness or virtual
defendant a limited right to the assistance of counsel, for he can con-
sult with counsel before and after testifying."' The witness is, how-
ever, denied the right to the presence of counsel while testifying."8 In
reviewing this right-to-counsel issue the court has rejected an innova-
tive argument advanced by the legal profession that a witness should
112. See Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1000 (1971).
113. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Haines, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 362, 90 A.2d 842 (1952). In
Haines, the conviction was based on PA. CONST. of 1874, art. III, § 32, which provided that
"[a]ny person may be compelled to testify in any lawful investigation or judicial proceed-
ing against any person who may be charged with having committed the offense of bribery
or corrupt solicitation . . .and shall not be permitted to withhold his testimony upon the
ground that it may criminate himself. This section was eventually deleted from the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
114. See Commonwealth v. Good, 461 Pa. 546, 337 A.2d 288 (1975). Accord, United
States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
115. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 350, 90 A.2d 838 (1952) (privilege
against self-incrimination is personal and may be waived by failure to assert it).
116. See Riccobene Appeal, 439 Pa. 404, 268 A.2d 104 (1970) (appellant held in con-
tempt for refusal to testify after having been granted immunity). See also note 77 and ac-
companying text supra.
117. See Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1000 (1971).
118. Id. The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a witness or vir-
tual defendant has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury. In In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), the Court stated that a
witness "cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional right, on being represented by his
counsel." Id at 333. Chief Justice Burger, writing for himself and three other Justices in
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), stated that since no criminal proceedings
had been instituted against the witness (virtual defendant) when summoned to testify,
"the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not come into play." Id. at 581 (citing Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)).
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, argued that a puta-
tive defendant should be entitled to counsel before testifying and may consult with his at-
torney prior to answering each question. Id. at 605 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). For further discussion on this point, see Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEO.
L.J. 1, 17 (1972); Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 701 (1968); Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand
Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189, 193 (1966); Steele, Right to Counsel at the Grand Jury Stage of
Criminal Proceedings, 36 Mo. L. REv. 193, 203 (1971).
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be entitled to consult with counsel prior to answering each question."9
Where an individual has been accused by name in the petition for a
grand jury investigation, the courts of Pennsylvania have decided
questions relating to the rights possessed by the named individual
without the benefit of United States Supreme Court precedent. In this
instance the Pennsylvania judiciary has recognized the existence of
other factors which alter the extent of the rights and privileges to be
granted the identified party. Because a petition specifically identified
individuals suspected of wrongdoing,'20 the issue of whether such
named individuals were to be extended any additional rights or privi-
leges was considered early. 2' It was decided that such witnesses stood
in the position of an accused and, therefore, had the right to remain
silent. 2 ' The analysis employed to reach this conclusion was rather
simple. The party named in the petition was one whose guilt or inno-
cence in relation to a specific offense was actually being investigated,
and consequently, his conduct became the main subject of the inquiry.
Any question directed to the named party must have as its object the
discovery of proof of the charge against him. Thus, the named indi-
vidual was not found to have the status of a witness, but that of an ac-
cused. 22 This view prevails today.
Initially, it was held that the remedy for violation of any of the ac-
cused's rights or privileges by the investigating grand jury was the
quashing of any indictment against the accused resulting from the
grand jury's presentment."' Subsequent decisions have dissolved any
notion of a per se remedy; whether a particular indictment is quashed
119. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 144-45, 277 A.2d 764, 778, cert denied,
404 U.S. 1000 (1971). The rationale offered by the court was that to hold otherwise "would
cause undue delay and all but terminate the institution of the investigatory grand jury."
Id. at 145, 277 A.2d at 778. Justice Brennan, concurring in United States v. Mandujano,
flatly rejected this argument, citing a "plethora" of reported cases permitting the witness
to leave the room at will. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 606 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment).
120. See note 40 supra.
121. The situation of an individual accused in a petition being called to testify is to be
distinguished from that of an individual who, subsequent to being called to testify, is
recommended for indictment in the presentment. This latter situation does not affect the
regularity of the proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Rhey, 140 Pa. Super. Ct. at 345, 14
A.2d at 195.
122. See Commonwealth v. Bane, 39 Pa. D. & C. 664, 666-67 (1940.
123. Id.
124. Id. The Bane decision, adopted by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Manko Ap-
peal, 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 180, 77 A.2d 700, 702 (1951), was subsequently explained by
the court in Commonwealth v. Gross, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 92 A.2d 251 (1952). There the
court noted that the defendants in Bane were indicted by the same grand jury before
which they were called as witnesses. Id. at 93, 92 A.2d at 255.
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or not presently depends upon the nature of the irregularity in the in-
vestigating grand jury's proceedings and its effect upon the indicting
grand jury.2 ' A violation of an accused's constitutional rights by the in-
vestigating grand jury is not necessarily sufficient cause, in and of
itself, to quash an indictment returned by a separate2 ' indicting grand
jury;"7 nor, on the other hand, must there be a constitutional violation
in order to quash an indictment.'28 Rather, the determinative factor is
that the irregularity encountered must be such that it causes prejudi-
cial harm to the accused.'"
There is an irreconcilable disparity of treatment between an indi-
vidual named in a petition and a virtual defendant. Just why an indi-
vidual named in a petition is more akin to an accused than is a virtual
defendant has yet to be explained by the courts. The rationale em-
ployed by Pennsylvania courts in Commonwealth v. Bane13 and Manko
Appeal"'1 was that the named witness was, in essence, an accused and
any attempt to gain testimony from him could only be in the hope of
obtaining "proof of the criminal charges." ' 2 This rationale, however, is
125. Compare Commonwealth v. Gross, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 92 A.2d 251 (1952) (in-
dictment not quashed where there is no evidence that the indicting grand jury was aware
of irregularities in grand jury investigation) with Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315,
108 A.2d 780 (1954) (motion to quash indictment should not have been dismissed where
there was evidence that the indicting grand jury used evidence illegally obtained by the
investigating grand jury).
126. It should be noted that a grand jury charged to conduct a special investigation
may also act as the indicting grand jury for the return of indictments resulting from the
investigation. See Commonwealth v. Bolger, 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 115 (1910), aff'd, 229 Pa.
597, 79 A. 113 (1911).
127. See Commonwealth v. Gross, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 92 A.2d 251 (1952).
128. See Commonwealth v. Levinson, 480 Pa. 273, 389 A.2d 1062 (1978) (indictment
based in part on the presentment of an investigating grand jury of which six of its mem-
bers were added as a group in the middle of the investigation must be quashed). See also
17 DuQ. L. REV. 929 (1979).
129. See note 125 and accompanying text supra. Since a presentment in most in-
stances provides the basis for the indictment, it seems rather clear that any irregularity
which contributes to the contents of the presentment provides a sufficient reason for
quashing the indictment. As stated by the Levinson court:
[A]n indictment based in part on the presentment of an investigating grand jury
which did not function in accordance with law to the prejudice of appellant must be
quashed. We therefore conclude that, having shown that that invalid presentment
formed a part of the indicting grand jury's considerations prior to returning a true
bill, appellee established that the indictment should be quashed.
Commonwealth v. Levinson, 480 Pa. at 290, 389 A.2d at 1070. See also Commonwealth v.
McCloskey, 443 Pa. at 147, 277 A.2d at 779 (indictment quashed where based on present-
ment drafted in part from testimony obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional
rights).
130. 39 Pa. D. & C. 664 (1940).
131. 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 77 A.2d 700 (1951).
132. Id. at 180, 77 A.2d at 701.
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equally applicable to virtual defendants. Further, this imprecise
system of affording full rights only to defendants named in the petition
leaves great room for abuse. Justice Brennan's opinion in Mandujano
was correct in noting that the restrictions against compelling the
named defendant to testify can easily be evaded by not including his
name in the petition. 1' This results in the witness' being relegated to
the position of a virtual defendant in which, under the Supreme
Court's trilogy,"M he has no more rights than a regular witness. In sum,
the constitutional rights of a person about to be indicted are easily cir-
cumvented by simply neglecting to mention the name of the potential
defendant in the petition.
One possible justification for continuing the disparity inherent in the
present system is that it eliminates the burdensome problem of ac-
tually determining who is and who is not a virtual defendant. Since
often only the prosecutor will know which witnesses he is about to in-
dict, this problem is not easily resolved. However, the most amiable
solution is to adopt a realistic test for determining when a grand jury
witness is actually a virtual defendant 35 and then to afford such virtual
defendants the same rights as those rendered to an individual named
in the petition. Remedying the lack of precision and manifest injustice
of the present system would seem to outweigh the difficulty of estab-
lishing a framework within which to identify those witnesses who, in
actuality, are potential defendants. In all fairness, they should be
treated as having the same rights as a named defendant.
IV. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAND JURY IN
PENNSYLVANIA: THE INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY ACT
On November 22, 1978, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the In-
vestigating Grand Jury Act, which provides a comprehensive scheme
for impaneling and conducting grand jury investigations. The legisla-
ture's selection of the term "investigating grand jury" is bound to con-
133. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
134. See notes 92-106 and accompanying text supra.
135. Various tests for determining which witness is a virtual defendant have been
offered. For example, Justice Brennan suggests that a virtual defendant is an individual
suspected of having committed a crime against whom the government has probable cause
as measured by an objective standard. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 598
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result). Judge Frank suggested a test which would
combine objective elements with the prosecutor's subsequent subjective intent to indict
the individual. See United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., con-
curring in the result).
136. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 265-278 (Purdon Supp. 1979). The complete title is "An
Act providing for investigating grand juries." In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court promulgated rules to supplement the Act. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 250-266.
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tribute to the present "terminological melange." '37 Significant differ-
ences between the legislatively created body and the judicially
developed investigatory grand juries now force the Pennsylvania com-
munity to be alert to the particular type of body involved because a
ruling regarding the statutorily created body may not be applicable to
the judicially created bodies.
The legislation provides for the summoning of investigating grand
juries upon application of the attorney for the commonwealth" or by
an order of a court acting upon its own motion."9 Additionally, the At-
torney General may make application for the convening of a multi-
county investigating grand jury."' Unlike the judicially developed
body, no provision is made for memorializing either of the two statu-
tory bodies."' Since few if any grand jury investigations have resulted
from memorials,"' the absence of such a provision is of little conse-
quence."3
According to the statutory prescription, the application for summon-
ing the investigating grand jury must state that the convening of the
grand jury is necessary because of the existence of criminal activity
within the county which can best be fully investigated through the use
of the resources available to that jury."" This provision incorporates
only a few of the judicial requirements held applicable to the conven-
ing of grand juries conducting investigations."' Consequently, because
137. See note 9 supra.
138. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 267(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979). The attorney for the com-
monwealth is defined as the district attorney or his designee, or the Attorney General or
his designee. Id § 266.
139. Id § 267(c). The procedure for summoning and convening the grand jury is
governed by id § 269 and PA. R. CRIM. P. 251-258.
140. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 268(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979). A multi-county investigating
grand jury may only be convened to investigate organized crime or public corruption in-
volving more than one county. Id. For a definition of organized crime and public corrup-
tion see id. § 266.
141. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
142. See Hamilton Appeal, 407 Pa. 366, 371, 180 A.2d 782, 785 (1962) (Cohen, J., con-
curring).
143. However, one possible detrimental consequence should be noted: namely, a cor-
rupt attorney for the commonwealth can prevent investigations by not filing an applica-
tion. But because a court can impanel a grand jury under the act on its own motion, this
consequence is for the most part eliminated. Additionally, a private citizen can still
memorialize a court for a grand jury investigation. Thus, a variety of means outside the
control of the attorney for the commonwealth exist for convening an investigation.
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 267(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
145. A grand jury conducting an investigation can only be convened where the subject
matter of the investigation affects the community as a whole; the investigation is aimed at
conditions and not individuals; the ordinary processes of law enforcement are inadequate;
and the investigation is directed at crimes, has a defined scope, and is supported by reli-
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the statutory body can be more easily summoned, the possibility exists
that investigations performed by judicially created grand juries will be
eliminated.
The duration of a statutory investigating grand jury is limited to
eighteen months' unless its request for an extension, not to exceed
six months,"7 is granted by the court.' Although the Act places a
more definite limitation on the term of a grand jury than have the
courts,' it does not preclude the summoning of successive investi-
gating grand juries directed to investigate the same subject. 5 ' In fact,
where the volume of work exceeds the capacity of a single investi-
gating grand jury, additional investigating grand juries may be im-
paneled."' In this respect, the limitation may be averted either by
convening successive grand juries to continue the investigation or by
impaneling several grand juries to assist in a single investigation.
Exploring the question of the proper scope of such an investigation,
the statute broadly states that the subjects of investigations are to be
"offenses against the criminal laws of the Commonwealth"'' 51 which are
brought to the attention of the jury either by the court" or the attor-
ney for the commonwealth." The statute prohibits "the investigating
grand jury from inquiring into alleged offenses on its own."' -5 How-
ever, the statute does provide that the "jurisdiction, powers and activi-
ties of an investigating grand jury shall not, if otherwise lawful, be
limited in any way by the charge of the court.""' The obvious conflict
existing between these sections is rectified by section 273, which per-
mits the attorney for the commonwealth to submit investigations to
the jury after submitting notice to the supervising judge. 157 These pro-
able information indicating the existence of a system of related crimes. See notes 38-45
and accompanying text supra. By way of comparison, the application for a statutorily
created county investigating grand jury need only state that its convening is necessary
"because of the existence of criminal activity ...which can best be fully investigated
using the investigative resources of the grand jury." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 267(b) (Pur-
don Supp. 1979). The pleading requirements for convening a multi-county investigating
grand jury are set out in id. § 268(a).
146. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 270(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
147. Id. § 270(b).
148. Id.
149. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
150. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 270(c) (Purdon Supp. 1979). The same requirements for
convening the initial grand jury apply to the convening of additional grand juries. Id.




156. Id. § 271(c).
157. Id. § 273.
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visions, read together, allow the grand jury to extend its investigation
into areas unrelated to the subject for which it was convened, provided
that the area of investigation is submitted by the attorney for the com-
monwealth. This is a clear departure from the judicial rules applicable
to grand jury investigations."' It remains to be seen whether this
departure will give rise to the "unrestrained delving into the affairs of
the whole community" of which the courts have been fearful.'59
The investigative resources allotted to the statutory body include
the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, the
power to take testimony from witnesses who have been granted im-
munity, the power to compel the production of documents, records and
other evidence, the power to obtain the initiation of civil and criminal
contempt proceedings, and every power available to any other grand
jury.6 ' Additionally, the grand jury can issue presentments.' and
reports,"2 and can indict individuals.'63 These resources are identical to
those of judicially created grand juries.' Moreover, the statute grants
witnesses the right to the advice of retained or appointed counsel dur-
ing such time as the witness is questioned.'' However, counsel may
not object to the questions asked or in any way address the grand jury
or the attorney for the commonwealth.' 8
Finally, the statute is silent as to the rights and privileges to be af-
forded virtual defendants and individuals named in a petition for a
grand jury investigation. Since the statute does not require allegation
of a specific crime in the petition, it is unlikely that such petitions will
explicitly name any individuals. Consequently, those individuals who in
the past were extended the rights and privileges of an accused because
the petition specifically named them will now most likely find them-
selves in the position of virtual defendants who are afforded no more
rights and privileges than those granted regular witnesses. Whether
this situation will lead to an increase in the use by prosecutors of the
tactic of summoning such targeted individuals for the sole purpose of
gathering evidence to indict them remains to be seen. Hopefully,
should this unfair situation flourish, the courts of Pennsylvania will
158. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
159. Smith v. Gallagher, 408 Pa. 551, 579, 185 A.2d 135, 149 (1962).
160. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 266 & 271 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
161. Id § 274(a).
162. Id § 275. A report is defined as a document regarding conditions relating to
organized crime or public corruption or proposing recommendations for legislative, execu-
tive, or administrative action. Id § 266.
163. Id. §§ 271 & 274.
164. See notes 16-19 & 72-81 and accompanying text supra.
165. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 272(c)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
166. Id. § 272(c). See also PA. R. CRIM. P. 264.
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react by devising a test for determining when an individual is a virtual
defendant and extending such individuals the rights of an accused.
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding comparison of the judicial and statutory grand juries
indicates a fundamental difference in view between the Pennsylvania
judiciary and the legislature regarding the role played by grand juries
charged to conduct investigations.' 7 The courts have recognized the
public prosecutor role by granting the grand jury powerful investiga-
tive tools. However, these tools are tempered by the restrictions which
the courts have imposed on the convening of investigatory grand
juries and on the scope of their investigations. This tempering reflects
the role of the grand jury as the protector of individual rights and
defender of freedom.
On the other hand, the legislature has created a potentially powerful
and effective investigative body. Since the statutory investigating
grand jury is more easily summoned" and can have the scope of its in-
vestigation extended beyond the initial charge of the court,"9 there is
no doubt that the legislature fully intended to create a body akin to a
public prosecutor. This is further evidenced by the extension of the
right to counsel during questioning.10 The statutory body has the
characteristics of a criminal proceeding for which witnesses summoned
to testify will surely be in need of legal assistance. The future of this
body is uncertain, but there can be no doubt that it has been specifi-
cally designed to play a major role in criminal investigations.
Richard W. Schimizzi
167. See notes 20-32 and accompanying text supra.
168. See notes 144-145 and accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 156-159 and accompanying text supra.
170. See notes 165-166 and accompanying text supra.
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